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COMPLAINT AND GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ONE PIECE OF THE 
ACCOUNTABILITY JIGSAW? 
Duncan French & Richard Kirkham*
In the rules and principles that guide and regulate international 
organisations, there has been a gradual, yet noticeable, transformation from 
a model premised upon a narrow conception of inter-governmentalism and 
formal legalism to one that is increasingly receptive to broader constitutional 
notions, including ideals such as enhancing legitimacy and promoting good 
governance.1 In this process, concepts such as accountability, transparency, 
public participation and due administration have become prevalent both in 
the rhetoric and everyday reality of international organisations. This article 
focuses upon one element of this wider discourse, namely the increased 
adoption within the international community of complaint and grievance 
mechanisms that operate outside the traditional legal framework. 
Such mechanisms are often administrative in nature, and thus clearly 
distinguishable from both judicial2 and quasi-judicial3 dispute settlement 
procedures, on the one hand, and more traditional diplomatic processes,4 
on the other. Moreover, though forming only one procedure amongst an 
array of “accountability” techniques increasingly employed by international 
* Both of the School of Law, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom. This article was 
previously published in a slightly different form as D French and R Kirkham “Complaint 
and Grievance Mechanisms in International Dispute Settlement” in D French, M Saul and 
N White International Law and Dispute Settlement: New Problems and Techniques (Hart, 
Oxford, 2010) at 57-85. With thanks to the anonymous reviewer for his/her extremely 
helpful and insightful comments.
1 On the law relating to international organisations, see for instance C Amerasinghe Principles 
of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005). As regards changing perceptions of international organisations, see for 
instance T Franck Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1995), J Nye “Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make International 
Institutions More Accountable” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2001) and N Woods “Good 
Governance in International Organizations” (1999) 5 Global Governance 39.
2 The reference to “judicial” should be read expansively to include judicial settlement per se (such 
as the proceedings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Convention 
of Human Rights), binding arbitration (such as that facilitated by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA)) and those systems (such as that within the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)) which employ a combination of both arbitration and judicial settlement (viz, the 
Appellate Body).
3 The reference to “quasi-judicial” refers, in particular, to the jurisdiction of autonomous 
international human rights bodies (such as the Human Rights Committee and the European 
Committee of Social Rights) to receive allegations of violations of human rights.
4 As regards the role of methods such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation and inquiry, see 
J Merrills International Dispute Settlement (4th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005) chapters 1-4.
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organisations,5 including ante-hoc (eg public document disclosure and 
consultation procedures), post-hoc (eg evaluation and audit) and ad hoc (eg 
committees of inquiry), the complaint and grievance mechanism stands 
out as an interesting, innovative and instrumental tool, both for affected 
stakeholders and for the organisations themselves. What is particularly 
encouraging is that such mechanisms seek to engage a range of communities 
beyond the intergovernmental level and incorporate the views and interests of 
civil society, which have previously been largely marginalised in the operation 
of such processes.
As this article will note, complaint and grievance mechanisms have 
been established within a wide array of international organisations, 
including both international financial institutions (eg the World 
Bank and regional development banks) and as part of the structure of 
internationally-administered territorial entities (including the so-called 
“Kosovo ombudsperson”). Moreover, as the report from the One World 
Trust highlights, accountability mechanisms have begun to be established 
not only within intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), but also within 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and transnational 
corporations (TNCs).6 
Of course, international complaint and grievance mechanisms take 
many forms and, as the article will show, some of these differences 
necessarily point to significant variations both in theoretical underpinning 
and operational practice. Moreover, substantial gaps remain; most of the 
current mechanisms that exist in the UN system, for instance, are exclusively 
concerned with personnel matters, rather than complaints arising from 
outside the organisation, though this should not be taken to imply that 
internal complaints mechanisms, including appropriate procedures to handle 
matters raised by “whistle-blowing”, are not intrinsic to good governance. 
Nevertheless, the idea of establishing a mechanism to hear public grievances, 
however putative the notion still is within many organisations, is increasingly 
emerging as integral to the broader debate on what is required for good global 
5 For instance, the non-governmental organisation the One World Trust publishes an annual 
Global Accountability Report, which contains four principal areas of analysis: transparency, 
participation, evaluation, and complaint and response mechanisms: <http://www.oneworldtrust.
org/?display=index_2007_home>.
6 J Ruggie Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. Business and 
human rights: further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework at [92], UN Doc A/HRC/14/27 (2010): “grievance mechanisms perform two 
key functions regarding the corporate responsibility to respect. First, they serve as early 
warning systems, providing companies with ongoing information about their current or 
potential human rights impacts from those impacted. By analysing trends and patterns 
in complaints, companies can identify systemic problems and adapt their practices 
accordingly. Second, these mechanisms make it possible for grievances to be addressed 
and remediated directly, thereby preventing harm from being compounded and grievances 
from escalating.” 
Complaint and Grievance Mechanisms in International Law 181
governance.7 This development is belatedly mirroring the trend towards 
“alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) that has occurred over the last fifty 
years at the national level.8 
Many of the complaint and grievance mechanisms in existence at the 
international level are reflective, perhaps even derivative, of processes and 
functions that already exist in the domestic sphere. The most prominent and 
wide-ranging form of ADR to have evolved at the national level is the office 
of the ombudsman, which is enshrined in many national constitutional, 
administrative and private structures.9 Given the potential within the 
ombudsman model, this article explores the impact of the idea in public 
international law. However, in recognising the sheer diversity in the range of 
national (and regional) ombudsmen, this article seeks neither to describe the 
“characteristic” ombudsman, nor to consider whether it has been adopted at 
the global level. Rather, the aim of this article is more nuanced: to consider 
to what extent core attributes of national ombudsmen and ombudsmen-
like processes can be ascertained in international complaint and grievance 
mechanisms. 
Many of the underlying issues inherent within any ombudsman 
scheme are particularly relevant when placed in the international context. 
Questions such as “who is entitled to complain?”, “what level of operational 
independence should a complaint and grievance mechanism enjoy?”, 
“what is the extent of the mechanism’s mandate and jurisdiction?”, and 
“what powers can the mechanism employ to achieve its purpose?” all raise 
complex institutional issues. A further question, but one that is arguably 
particularly interesting in this context, is “what are the objectives of a 
complaint and grievance mechanism?” These objectives could range from 
reviewing the organisation’s compliance with its own procedures, fostering 
friendly solutions to disputes, investigating maladministration and/or 
promoting human rights, through to promoting a “lessons learnt” approach 
within the wider institution. Of course, all of these questions are inherently 
generic and applicable to any level of governance, yet they are potentially 
7 M Zwanenburg Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Brill, Leiden, 2005) at 300: “the 
concept of the ombudsman does exist at the international level. It has developed mainly as a 
corollary of the demand for accountability of international organizations, and in particular 
accountability towards individuals.”
8 It should be noted that the use of methods such as conciliation, fact-finding and mediation 
at the international level have a much longer history: see generally Merrills, above n 4. As 
regards the continued use of ADR methods between States, see also suggestions for the 
establishment of an ombudsman within the WTO as a precursor and supplement to the 
formal dispute settlement system that operates between member States. (See “The Multilateral 
Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? The report of the first Warwick Commission” (2007) 
Warwick Commission at 33 <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission>: 
“This would offer an initial non-litigious avenue for settlement and would also serve to 
inform consultations in the next stage of the dispute settlement process should the informal 
mediation fail to deliver amicable settlement.”)
9 See for instance R Gregory and P Giddings (eds) Righting Wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six 
Continents (IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2000).
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more interesting, if also contentious, when placed within a global context. 
International organisations, which have so long had to balance carefully 
sovereign membership with limited institutional independence, are also now 
having to balance such autonomy with popular concerns of accountability 
and transparency.
In addressing these issues, the article is divided into four parts. Part one 
reviews the theoretical arguments in favour of complaint and grievance 
mechanisms outside the traditional legal/judicial model. It also considers 
some of the lessons that can be derived from the experiences gained at the 
national level from the use of perhaps the most advanced form of complaint 
and grievance mechanism outside the courts, the ombudsman. Part two 
provides a brief overview of the development of complaint and grievance 
mechanisms within international organisations and analyses the extent 
to which ombudsman characteristics (as, in some ways, the most readily 
identifiable form of complaint and grievance) have been embedded within 
international models. Part three then offers some thoughts on the potential 
for greater use to be made of the ombudsman institution in the United 
Nations more generally. 
The article will then contend in part four that the key attributes of 
complaint and grievance processes are arguably central to implementing 
the ubiquitous notions of good governance10 and due process – thus further 
supporting the cross-fertilisation of ideas inherent within the discourse 
on global administrative law. Despite this, the international community 
still has a long way to go before it embraces fully the potential contained 
within especially the ombudsman concept, even though concurrently it is 
also arguable that automatic replication of national ombudsmen should be 
avoided. Complaint and grievance mechanisms at the international level 
are innovative both in their contribution to the operation of international 
organisations and as an alternative model vis-à-vis traditional dispute 
settlement procedures. Nevertheless, in truth it is the structural limitations 
of such mechanisms, as much as the opportunities they provide, which 
reveal a more complete analysis of the recurring tensions within global 
governance. Yet the inherent weaknesses of non-judicial complaints and 
grievance mechanisms are also a potential strength. Such “softer” forms of 
dispute resolution, which are able to bend more easily to the strictures of a 
system of law ultimately grounded in the sovereignty of States, rather than 
break when confronted directly against them, are arguably more amenable 
to the incorporation of ideals of legitimacy and governance than traditional 
dispute resolution regimes.
10 For an overview of good governance and, in particular, its linkages with the development 
of complaint and grievance mechanisms, both nationally and internationally, see L Reif The 
Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden, 2004) chapter 3.
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I. The Theory Behind Complaint and Grievance Mechanisms
The existence of complaint and grievance mechanisms at the global level, 
especially if made available to affected civil society and local communities, 
could rightly be heralded as a milestone in the organisation of international 
affairs. This development is a sign of a – gradual – shift away from a purely 
intergovernmental approach to one premised upon broader notions of global 
regulation and administration. As the impact and reach of such organisations 
increasingly transcend State boundaries and thus have the capacity to affect 
the lives and livelihoods of individuals, the call for greater accountability of 
such organisations was perhaps inevitable.11 The fact that many organisations 
remain resistant to wholesale change, or hold on to the “old” premise that 
they are primarily engaged in technical matters and thus outside popular 
concern, should not disguise the fact that the discourse on global governance 
has changed dramatically over recent years.
Such change has been mirrored by a shift in perspective on the role of 
global organisations within the broader parameter of international relations. 
As Krisch and Kingsbury note:12
… central pillars of the international legal order are seen from a classical perspective as 
increasingly challenged: the distinction between domestic and international law becomes 
more precarious, soft forms of rule-making are ever more widespread, the sovereign 
equality of states is gradually undermined, and the legitimacy of international law is 
increasingly in doubt. 
One response to such challenges has been to import values – traditionally 
dominant within the domestic and regional sphere – into the global 
consciousness. For want of a better name, such analysis is often referred to as 
global administrative law:13 
It starts from the observation that much of global governance can be understood as 
regulation and administration … [T]he increasing exercise of public power in these 
structures has given rise to serious concerns about legitimacy and accountability, 
prompting patterns of responses to those concerns in many areas of global governance. 
While recognising the merits of some of the insights of the global 
administrative law approach, there is an equal recognition that “classical” 
international law remains very much the dominant paradigm. There are 
thus noticeable tensions between demands for greater legitimacy and 
transparency, on the one hand, and a retrenched belief in the traditional 
notions of sovereignty and political autonomy, on the other. It is the response 
11 More generally, see D Bodansky “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming 
Challenge for International Environmental Law” (1999) 93 AJIL 596 at 611: “the more 
international environmental law resembles domestic law, the more it should be subject to the 
same standards of legitimacy that animate domestic law.” 
12 N Krisch and B Kingsbury “Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order” (2006) 17 EJIL 1 at 1. On the issue of legitimacy at 
the international level, more generally, see Franck, above n 1, chapter 2.
13 Krisch and Kingsbury, above n 12.
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of international organisations in reconciling such considerations that is very 
much the driving force behind recent attempts to establish complaint and 
grievance mechanisms as a novel means of dispute resolution.
The significance of complaint and grievance mechanisms is that they can 
contribute to the promotion of a variety of constitutional values. Perhaps 
of most importance is their capacity to provide a realistic route by which 
grievances can be effectively pursued by those most immediately affected. 
Thus, the existence of such mechanisms compensates for the classic critique 
of the ability of judicial bodies to uphold the rule of law only when it falls 
within the narrow strictures of a particular factual matrix, as well as reflecting 
the almost universal truth that formal processes tend to be difficult to take 
advantage of and are prohibitively expensive and intimidating for the average 
litigant. With the work of international organisations increasingly impacting 
directly on the lives of individual citizens, these are important considerations 
if those same institutions are to obtain legitimacy. Moreover, the lack of a 
comprehensive judicial framework at the international level, particularly one 
which does not provide individuals with any meaningful role – other than 
in the case of the few human rights courts which permit individual claims 
against States – exacerbates both the general problem and highlights the need 
for alternative procedures.
But the value of complaint and grievance mechanisms can go further than 
securing redress. Complaint and grievance mechanisms can be utilised not 
only to call to account the actions of international organisations, but they can 
provide tangible evidence to the wider community that they are accountable 
and, at the same time, provide heightened incentives for international 
organisations to focus on the promotion of internal good governance. 
Furthermore, if permitted, complaint and grievance mechanisms can also 
monitor the responses of international organisations to their investigations 
and even work with investigated bodies to identify potential areas for 
institutional improvement. 
Operating along these lines there are now a considerable number of 
complaint and grievance mechanisms at the international level that are 
worthy of study. Problems exist within many of these mechanisms and the 
potential gains from this form of dispute resolution have only just begun to 
be identified. In particular, it is evident that the global community has yet 
to adopt in full the ombudsman model, which has proved so popular at the 
national level. This must be considered a distinct area for future exploration as 
it has been amply demonstrated at the level of the State that the ombudsman 
can be a particularly useful tool in the resolution of those disputes with a 
quasi-political dimension. Given this potential, it could be that over the next 
twenty to thirty years we will see ever more ambitious models of complaint 
and grievance mechanisms playing an increasingly significant role in the 
further development of international dispute resolution.
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A. The Ombudsman Technique – Lessons From the National Level 
The technique of “ombudsmanry” has been described by one author as “the 
jurisprudential development of the 20th century”,14 whilst others have charted 
the incredible growth in the popularity of the idea in the latter half of the last 
century.15 There are now national, local and state ombudsmen in operation 
in approximately 120 countries16 and a growing body of academic literature 
is dedicated to this form of complaint and grievance mechanism.17 At the 
national level there have also been significant developments in theoretical and 
practical thinking as to how best to resolve disputes, which has resulted in at 
least a partial shift away from dispute resolution led by lawyers and an ever 
growing emphasis on so-called “alternative dispute resolution mechanisms”, 
of which the ombudsman is the most important example. 
As with complaint and grievance mechanisms at the international level, 
there is much to differentiate the various models of ombudsman adopted 
around the world.18 With a few notable exceptions,19 most are relatively young 
institutions. The vast majority of ombudsmen now in operation around the 
world were established in the last fifty years and, in many cases, the last 
twenty years. As a consequence, in many countries there is still a lack of full 
appreciation and knowledge as to how the institution operates and what it 
is fully capable of. Thus, the concept of ombudsmanry is still in its infancy. 
Moreover, the development of the practice has been hampered by a number 
of factors. Commonly, new ombudsman institutions are required to spend a 
significant amount of institutional energy embedding their place within the 
14 N Lewis “World Ombudsman Community: aspects and prospects” (1993) 39 Indian Journal 
of Public Administration 676. 
15 Gregory and Giddings, above n 9.
16 See the International Ombudsman Institute website for details: <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/
centres/ioi/About-the-I.O.I./History-and-Development.php>.
17 While the notion of “complaint and grievance mechanism” is sufficiently broad to incorporate 
the office of the ombudsman, at the national level it is generally more appropriate to refer 
to “ombudsman” as that is the principal – though not exclusive – mechanism by which 
grievances are aired outside the formal legal context. However, see Reif, above n 10, at 366 
where she makes a distinction between the office of ombudsman and mechanisms such as the 
World Bank’s inspection panel: “a classical ombudsman is a non-judicial, soft mechanism 
having only the sanctions of recommendation and public reporting. The inspection panel 
has even more limited functions and powers”. There is further discussion of the World Bank 
Inspection Panel below.
18 Around the world, ombudsman institutions are given a range of different of titles. As the 
website for the International Ombudsman Institute <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/
ioi/About-the-I.O.I./History-and-Development.php> explains, “Defensor del Pueblo is the 
title of the ombudsman office in a number of Spanish-speaking countries (such as in Spain, 
Argentina, Peru and Colombia). Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Sri Lanka, 
United Kingdom), Médiateur de la République (eg France, Gabon, Mauritania, Senegal), 
Public Protector (South Africa), Protecteur du Citoyen (Québec), Volksanwaltschaft (Austria), 
Public Complaints Commission (Nigeria), Provedor de Justiça (Portugal), Difensore Civico 
(Italy), Investigator-General (Zambia), Citizen’s Aide (Iowa), Wafaqi Mohtasib (Pakistan), and 
Lok Ayukta (India) are the titles of some other ombudsman offices around the world.”
19 In particular, the office of the Swedish Ombudsman (Justitieombudsman) is two hundred 
years old in 2009.
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constitutional order and gaining the acceptance of both citizens and established 
public authorities, including the courts. Other barriers to successful operation 
include securing adequate funding, maintaining independence and persuading 
authorities to implement their recommendations. Such institutional barriers, 
coupled with the relative newness of this form of dispute resolution mechanism, 
means that there is still little agreed understanding, and few practical examples, 
as to the full capacity of the ombudsman institution.20 These inherent problems 
put into context the relative underdevelopment of the idea at the international 
level and, at the same time, highlight a key lesson: that the relative strength of 
ombudsman schemes owes much to the background political and institutional 
support that they receive.
A generic observation that can be made about ombudsmanry at the 
national level is the lack of uniformity in the model that has been adopted. 
Although there have been efforts to describe the “classical ombudsman”,21 in 
truth the key feature of the ombudsman institution is its flexibility and the 
ability for the office to be moulded to meet a variety of different needs and 
situations. A few examples serve to demonstrate the point. In Latin America, 
where the ombudsman (the Defensor del Pueblo) has become an important 
part of the constitutional scene, the office is normally established along 
the model developed in Spain and Portugal. This entails that the primary 
focus of the institution has been to promote and protect human rights and 
uphold human rights legislation and treaties. A similar development can be 
seen to have occurred in Eastern Europe and in several countries in Africa. 
By contrast, in the Nordic countries, where the modern ombudsman began, 
the onus has been on using the institution as an upholder of the law, with 
there being an explicit crossover between the work of the courts and the 
ombudsman. In common law countries, however, much less emphasis is placed 
on the ombudsman pursuing breaches of the law, with instead ombudsmen 
empowered to investigate alleged breaches of more equitable standards, such 
as maladministration or denial of fairness. 
Thus, the ombudsman model has proved to be an extremely adaptable 
tool that has contributed to dealing with a variety of jurisprudential problems 
in a range of different jurisdictions. The concept has also crossed over from 
the public to the private sector and has been used to tackle issues as diverse 
as the environment and corruption.22 Given that the ombudsman has proved 
to be flexible at the national level, it is hardly surprising that it has been 
identified as a potentially useful device at the international level, despite the 
very different issues of governance that arise.
20 For a more detailed exposition, see T Buck, R Kirkham and B Thompson The Ombudsman 
Enterprise and Administrative Justice (Ashgate, 2011, forthcoming). 
21 D Gottehrer and M Hostina Essential Characteristics of a Classical Ombudsman (1998) United States 
Ombudsman Association <http://www.usombudsman.org/en/references/more_references/>.
22 For example in Hungary, there is now a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of 
Future Generations which is responsible for environmental protection and in India the lead 
function of the “Lok Ayukta” is to investigate allegations of fraud.
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Insofar as there is such a thing as a “classical ombudsman” model, the key is 
the specific institutional features that the ombudsman ordinarily possesses.23 
Above all, ombudsmen are seen as independently appointed officers of the 
state or parliament who operate autonomously of the executive and public 
authority more generally. The most significant evidence of their autonomy is 
found in the wide-ranging powers that they possess to summon witnesses and 
discover documents. However, in stark contrast to their investigatory powers, 
ombudsmen do not ordinarily possess any powers of legal enforcement. 
Indeed, such enforcement powers are considered to be contradictory to the 
overall methodology of the ombudsman. Rather than being an institution 
of legal authority and force, the key technique of the ombudsman is one of 
intellectual authority and powers of persuasion backed up, if necessary, by 
access to means of political pressure and embarrassment.
There are further flexibilities inherent in the ombudsman technique that 
are also key to their popularity and potential. Although the primary aim of 
the institution is to resolve grievances and secure redress, the ombudsman 
is capable of achieving much more. Due to its design, the ombudsman has 
an inherent capacity to promote accountability and institutional learning. 
Its strong investigatory powers enable it to obtain information that classic 
techniques of legal dispute resolution can find hard to uncover, while the 
softer approach necessitated by the lack of powers of enforcement generally 
facilitates a more positive cooperative relationship with the public authorities 
investigated.24 At its best, the nature of this relationship, backed up by the 
ombudsman’s broad inquisitorial powers, enables the ombudsman to uncover 
information and arrive at an understanding of events that adds significantly 
to the wider constitutional efforts to secure the accountability of public 
authorities. More than that though, the softer approach of the ombudsman 
can encourage the public authority involved to take on board the complaints 
handling process as an opportunity to learn rather than a challenge to 
resist. While ombudsmen may deliver firm conclusions, which can have 
a significant long-term impact, in general, ombudsmen seek to emphasise 
potential solutions and ways forward to address the errors made. Again, 
given the frequently politically sensitive overtone of activities undertaken by 
international organisations, such a soft law approach to dispute resolution has 
many attractions. 
As argued above, the full potential of the ombudsman institution 
is only just beginning to be properly explored at the national level. The 
New South Wales Ombudsman, for instance, now has a remit that goes 
well beyond resolving complaints or promoting good administration to 
include conducting own-initiative investigations,25 scrutinising systems in 
place within government agencies and reviewing the implementation of 
23 Gottehrer and Hostina, above n 21.
24 M Hertogh, “Coercion, Cooperation, and Control: Understanding the Policy Impact of 
Administrative Courts and the Ombudsman in the Netherlands” (2001) 23 Law and Policy 47.
25 These are investigations initiated even without the submission of a complaint.
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legislation.26 There is, however, an argument to suggest that the ombudsman 
is a particularly useful institution in those areas where law meets politics 
and/or where dispute resolution is complicated by the existence of a number 
of different competing political and social interests. Lon Fuller famously 
argued that courts were not a good place to resolve what he described as 
polycentric disputes.27 In polycentric disputes there are a range of conflicting 
interests involved, with it being highly probable that not all affected parties 
are represented in the dispute. In such disputes often there are also moral 
judgments to be made and difficult issues of resource allocation to face up 
to. In short, the dispute is politically and morally complex with contentious 
issues which, taken together, make the balancing exercise that has to be then 
undertaken by the dispute resolution mechanism beyond the boundaries 
of traditional legal reasoning. Yet there is still a dispute to be resolved. An 
argument in favour of the ombudsman technique being used to resolve such 
complex disputes is that it is not restricted by the arguments presented by 
the immediate parties and has wide investigatory powers to pursue all the 
issues involved. Perhaps of even more importance though is the idea that 
because it has no binding powers of enforcement the ombudsman cannot 
rely upon its legal authority to force a solution. Instead, the ombudsman is 
driven by necessity to make logically consistent and defensible findings and 
to use its tools of persuasion, as well as logical reasoning, to arrive at workable 
solutions:28 
It may be stated that this inability to force change represents the central strength of 
the office and not its weakness. It requires that recommendations must be based on 
a thorough investigation of all facts, scrupulous consideration of all perspectives and 
vigorous analysis of all issues. Through this application of reason, the results are infinitely 
more powerful than through the application of coercion. 
All of the characteristics noted above make the ombudsman institution 
an extremely interesting jurisprudential device. It is no doubt because of 
these features that the number of ombudsmen around the world has grown 
significantly over the last fifty years. At the same time in many countries 
the limitations of the court mechanism have become steadily more apparent, 
further fuelling the search for other solutions. Evidently, there are certain 
issues that are best resolved in the courts and in general it is understood that 
questions of legal interpretation should remain the prerogative of the courts. 
Yet in many other instances the highly procedural, cumbersome and restrictive 
way in which legal disputes are resolved is inappropriate, excessively expensive 
and often not particularly relevant to the needs of either side of the dispute. 
On a wider constitutional level, it is also of concern that while the court 
process provides a very strong form of accountability, it does not always make 
26 For details see NSW Ombudsman <http://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/>.
27 L Fuller “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978-1979) 92 Harv L Rev 353.
28 S Owen “The Ombudsman: essential Elements and Common Challenges” in L Reif, M 
Marshall and C Ferris (eds) The Ombudsman: Diversity and Development (International 
Ombudsman Institute, Edmonton, 1992) 52.
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a particularly positive long-term contribution towards improved governance 
within public bodies. In these two senses, the ombudsman’s flexibility allows 
it to provide a much more tailored and constructive service. 
II. Complaint and Grievance Mechanisms at the 
International Level
The aim of this second part is to consider how far the underlying values 
of the ombudsman have been endorsed at the international level through the 
development of complaint and grievance mechanisms. With the exception 
of the European Ombudsman,29 it is difficult to find any examples of fully 
fledged ombudsman systems along the lines established at the nation-state level. 
Nevertheless, there does exist a range of complaint and grievance mechanisms 
that adopt various aspects of the technique and/or pursue similar objectives. 
In one sense, complaint and grievance mechanisms are reasonably well 
established in international organisations. Thus, for instance, one area where the 
introduction of complaint and grievance mechanisms has been significant has 
been in areas of internal dispute resolution between international organisations 
and their staff.30 To name but a few, the United Nations, the World Health 
Organization, the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Trade Organization all employ some form of workplace ombudsman 
or mediator to deal with staff grievances. But as Reif notes:31
… this type of ombudsman mechanism should not be overly controversial or threatening 
to either international organization or member state interests. Rather, the model is 
designed to settle secretariat employment disputes informally, avoid the more legalistic 
and expensive formal dispute settlement alternatives and thereby improve both staff 
morale and organizational efficiency. 
This is, of course, an interesting and important development. Not only 
does it demonstrate a healthy commitment from international organisations 
towards taking the rights of their employees seriously, but it also provides 
evidence of awareness of the benefits of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. However, these internal forms of dispute resolution only touch 
upon the surface of what such mechanisms can offer. 
In this part some of the more far-reaching forms of complaint and 
grievance mechanisms are considered. What can be noticed is that 
though such mechanisms might, at first glance, appear rather distinctive 
from traditional notions of the national ombudsman, there are also key 
similarities. These include that the aim of such mechanisms is to resolve 
29 The European Ombudsman is modelled on the ombudsman design that has evolved, albeit 
in subtly different forms, in EU Member States. Thus the European Ombudsman is fully 
independent, investigates maladministration, has strong investigatory powers (including 
through a power of own initiative investigation) and reports to the European Parliament. See 
The European Ombudsman <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home/en/default.htm>.
30  For a general overview of such international ombudsmen, see Reif, above n 10, at 336-346.
31  Ibid, at 364-365.
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grievances without recourse to formal judicial proceedings, that they are 
established to operate independently and autonomously and that their 
authority derives not from any designated powers of enforcement but 
purely from the persuasiveness of their arguments. Of course, there are 
significant divergences in approach – as there are at the national level – but 
such differences should not mask the very real synergies that nevertheless 
exist between such mechanisms. 
A. World Bank Inspection Panel: A Radical, Yet Conservative, Innovation
One of the earliest, and certainly one of the most discussed, complaint and 
grievance mechanisms at the international level is the World Bank’s32 Inspection 
Panel.33 Established in 1993, its creation was an institutional response to 
criticism that the World Bank was failing to follow its own internal policies 
and procedures, specifically with regard to the negative impact World Bank 
sponsored large infrastructural projects were having on local environments 
and communities.34 Significantly, such criticism did not just come from civil 
society, but also included some of the Bank’s own members, most noticeably 
the United States.35 In the light of such pressure, the World Bank had little 
choice but to respond. The Inspection Panel was rightly heralded as the first 
international organisation to seek to address such accountability concerns, 
though it is perhaps more conservative than radical in its actual operation, 
certainly as compared to other, more recent, mechanisms.36
32 Technically, the “World Bank” is shorthand for the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). It is these 
two institutions which jointly established the Inspection Panel, and over whose activities 
the Panel may receive complaints. As regards other institutional components of the World 
Bank group, both the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) have developed an alternative model: the office of the Compliance 
Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), whose role combines the investigation of complaints, 
overseeing compliance reviews of IFC/MIGA activities and providing independent advice to 
IFC/MIGA management on environmental and social aspects of their policies.
33 See generally D Clark, J Fox and K Treakle Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims 
and the World Bank Inspection Panel (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003), I Shihata The 
World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000), 
S Schlemmer-Schulte “The World Bank’s Experience With Its Inspection Panel” (1998) 58 
ZaöRV/HJIL 353, and C Chinkin “Alternative Dispute Resolution under International Law” 
in M Evans (ed) Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma (Hart, Oxford, 
1998) 123 at 134-137.
34 For the range of issues that beset the World Bank in the early 1990s, see K Horta “The World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund” in J Werksman (ed) Greening International 
Institutions (Earthscan, London, 1996) 131 at 132-133.
35 I Bowles and C Kormos “Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The Role of the U.S. 
Congress” (1994-1995) 35 Va J Int’l L 777. See also R Bissell and S Nanwani “Multilateral 
Development Bank Accountability Mechanisms: Developments and Challenges” (2009) 6 
MJIEL 2.
36 For a comprehensive analysis of such mechanisms within multilateral development banks and 
related institutions, see D Bradlow “Private Complainants and International Organizations: 
A Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial 
Institutions” (2004-2005) 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 403.
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The function of the Inspection Panel is to consider allegations from 
persons, and in certain circumstances their representatives, whose:37
… rights or interests have been or are likely to be directly affected by an action or 
omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its operational policies 
and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project 
financed by the Bank … provided in all cases that such failure has had, or threatens to 
have, a material adverse effect. 
The Inspection Panel – though housed in the World Bank – is independent 
of the World Bank’s management and reports directly to the Board of 
Executive Directors, individuals who are either appointed or selected by the 
Bank’s member State constituencies. The three members who make up the 
Inspection Panel are appointed for one five-year term and though as officials 
of the Bank are subject to the requirement of exclusive loyalty to the Bank,38 
their appointment is based upon, inter alia, “their ability to deal thoroughly 
and fairly with the requests brought to them, their integrity and their 
independence from the Bank’s Management”.39
The Inspection Panel is neither a binding nor a judicial process; its purpose 
is to investigate allegations and to report its findings to the Bank’s Board of 
Executive Directors, which will – together with the management’s response 
and, where appropriate, its recommendations for remedial action – “consider” 
the matter.40 The Inspection Panel procedure is a two-stage process, involving 
first, a determination whether an allegation requires investigation, and 
second, the investigation itself. As regards the first stage of the process, since 
1999 the Executive Board has automatically authorised an investigation 
“without making a judgement on the merits of the claimants’ request”, so 
long as certain “technical eligibility criteria” are met.41 
As regards investigations, several key points are worth noting. First, the 
Panel is entitled to interview all relevant Bank staff and to access all pertinent 
Bank records in undertaking its investigations. Second, the Panel will, where 
necessary, consult with other internal Bank accountability and evaluation 
bodies, including the independent evaluation group42 and the internal auditor. 
37 The World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution No. IBRD 93-10/Resolution No. IDA 93-6 
(1993) at [12].
38 Ibid, at [10].
39 Ibid, at [4]. For a more detailed account of how the Inspection Panel operates, see A Gualtieri 
“The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State Actors: Insights from 
the Inspection Panel” (2001) LXXII British Yearbook of International Law 213. 
40 Merrills, above n 4, at 62: “The findings of the Panel are not binding, but based as they are 
on impartial investigation … carry considerable weight. As evaluation has a quasi-judicial 
aspect, Panel reports go beyond inquiry in the strict sense, but clearly incorporate a significant 
fact-finding element.”
41 “1999 Clarification of the Board’s Second Review of the Inspection Panel” (1999) at [9] 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/1999Clarificati
onoftheBoard.pdf>.
42 Independent Evaluation Group “Mandate of the Director-General, Evaluation” at 1 <http://
go.worldbank.org/GU2KYF31B0>: “The independent evaluation function is responsible for 
the assessment of the relevance, efficacy, and efficiency of World Bank Group’ operational 
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Third, where inspections are to take place in the territory of the borrower 
country, they shall not be carried out unless prior consent has been given, 
though there is equally an explicit assumption that consent will be granted. 
During such visits, though the Bank recognises that Panel members will wish 
“to gather information through consultations with affected people”,43 the 
rules governing Panel activities do very carefully note that such in-country 
investigations should:44
… be kept as low [-profile] as possible in keeping with its role as a fact-finding body on 
behalf of the Board. The Panel’s methods of investigation should not create the impression 
that it is investigating the borrower’s performance. 
This language is particularly interesting as it reflects the diverse pressures 
between improving global governance, on the one hand, and respecting 
domestic sovereignty, on the other.
The Inspection Panel has now been in existence for over fifteen years, 
and has conducted an increasing number of important investigations. The 
results of these investigations have prompted the Bank’s management to 
make significant changes to a number of high-profile projects,45 as well as 
affecting the operation of its overall project cycle.46 It can also be claimed that 
as a result of the Inspection Panel’s work there is “much greater sensitivity 
in the institutions to their own operational policies and procedures”.47 As 
Bissell, a one-time chairman of the panel, has commented, the Inspection 
Panel is both “enriching and modifying the Bank’s approach to its legal 
obligations”.48 Changes are, of course, most likely to occur when the project 
remains at an early stage of implementation. Those projects reviewed at a 
later stage of development have, therefore, proved much more difficult to 
remedy. 
A significant weakness identified by a number of commentators is the lack 
of ongoing supervision:49 
The Inspection Panel does not have oversight authority over the implementation of those 
remedial measures; nor is it able to provide the Board with an assessment of whether 
Management’s proposed remedial measures would satisfy the concerns of the claimants 
and/or bring the project into compliance with Bank policy. 
programs and activities, and their contribution to development effectiveness. Evaluation 
enhances accountability and informs the formulation of new directions, policies and 
procedures, and country and sector strategies for the Bank’s work.”
43 “1999 Clarification”, above n 41, at [12].
44 Ibid.
45 R Bissell “Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank” (1997) 91 AJIL 
741. See also the annual reports of the Inspection Panel <http://www.worldbank.org/
inspectionpanel>.
46 See Bradlow, above n 36, at 409-410.
47 Ibid.
48 Bissell, above n 36, at 744.
49 D Clark, “The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability” (2002) 
15 Harv Hum Rts J 205 at 218.
Complaint and Grievance Mechanisms in International Law 193
This is a significant weakness and one that some of the subsequent 
mechanisms established in the wake of the Inspection Panel have sought to 
resolve. The Compliance Review Panel of the Asian Development Bank, for 
instance, monitors implementation of remedial measures and reports to the 
Board annually on issues of implementation.50 More recently, there have been 
examples where the World Bank Board of Executive Directors has itself asked 
the Inspection Panel to review the Bank Management’s progress reports on 
implementing its action plans.51 This is a positive step forward, but one which 
should be codified within the legal framework which established the Panel, 
particularly as such an innovation would seem, in fact, to be contrary to the 
stated expectations of how the Panel would operate, as set out in the initial 
Bank resolutions on the matter.52
Moreover, there is also some argument that the very existence of the 
Inspection Panel (along with the World Bank’s safeguard policies which the 
Panel monitors) has had a potentially detrimental effect on how the Bank 
operates in practice. It has been suggested that such innovations not only 
encourage Bank staff to focus too specifically on “panel-proofing” Bank 
activities, but also they provide a negative incentive within the Bank to water 
down the policies on which the Panel reports:53 
When the Bank first adopted environmental safeguard policies, the policies tended to be 
comprehensive and demanding. The Bank saw the policies as guiding policies, rather than 
as binding rules. When civil society began demanding compliance with these policies, 
the conversion process weakened them in an attempt to make them easier to meet. 
Of course, if true, this clearly suggests that – at one level – the Inspection 
Panel must be operating reasonably successfully, otherwise there would be 
no need for such a reactive response. Politically, however, civil society and 
its member States should seek to ensure that positive institutional change, 
such as the establishment and effective operation of the Inspection Panel, 
does not prompt retreat in other areas, notably the normative and procedural 
standards under which the Bank operates.
Overall, the Inspection Panel must be considered an important 
institutional development both within the World Bank itself and as a precursor 
to the development of other mechanisms elsewhere, specifically within other 
international financial organisations. Nevertheless, as Hunter notes:54
50 Bradlow, above n 36, at 431.
51 The Inspection Panel Annual Report: July 1, 2006, to June 30, 2007 (The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007) at 15: 
“During fiscal year 2007, the Panel also reviewed, at the Board’s request, Management’s 
Progress report on its Action Plan in response to the Panel’s Investigation Report on the 
Mumbai Urban Transport Project.”
52 “1999 Clarifications”, above n 41, at [16]: “The Board should not ask the Panel for its view on 
other aspects of the action plans nor would it ask the Panel to monitor the implementation of 
the action plans.”
53 N Bridgeman “World Bank Reform in the ‘Post-Policy’ Era” (2000-2001) 13 Geo Int’l Envtl 
L Rev 1013 at 1024.
54 D Hunter “Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of Project-
Affected People” (2003) 4 Chi J Int’l L 201 at 210.
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The Panel is still a work in progress. … [T]he short-term benefits that come from the 
added attention brought by filing a Panel claim do not necessarily translate into long-
term sustainable benefits.
This seems also to be the benchmark that the Panel sets itself; as it noted 
in its 2006-2007 annual report, “[w]e hope that our work will contribute to 
ensuring sustainable and equitable development, an important goal of the 
World Bank.”55 High rhetoric, of course, but also containing a certain element 
of truth; as with much of the general movement towards accountability and 
good governance in the international arena, the changes are not intended to be 
the end-goal, but will hopefully also improve the delivery of the organisation’s 
wider aims and purposes.
B. Mechanisms Within Other International Institutions
The World Bank may have been the first multilateral development bank 
to adopt such a mechanism for external grievances and complaints, but 
many other institutions, particularly – though not exclusively – international 
financial institutions, have also responded to such demands for accountability 
to create their own procedures and systems. 
Though it is beyond the limits of this article to review these mechanisms, 
there are certain general themes surrounding the development of complaint 
and grievance mechanisms in international law which can be noted. 
Bradlow, in his work on complaint mechanisms within international 
financial organisations, for instance highlights a number of key issues. First, 
he argues that the range of functions that such mechanisms undertake vary 
greatly to include not only compliance-review (as with the World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel) but also, in some instances, problem-solving/mediation 
and significantly, at the culmination of an investigation, a “lessons learnt” 
and dissemination of good practice role. Both of these additional functions 
are important, if for slightly different reasons. As regards problem-solving/
mediation, he argues:56
In reality, non-state actors are more interested in having the problems caused by the 
organization’s operations solved than they are in ensuring that the staff and management 
comply with the applicable operational policies and procedures. 
As regards the inclusion of a “lessons learnt” function, this can:57
… demonstrate to the organization’s staff and management and to its member states that 
the purpose of the mechanism is not ‘finger pointing’ but improvement in the operations 
of the organization.
Civil society will also wish to know that the international organisation 
has learnt from its mistakes and will – hopefully – not replicate the same 
errors again. On both issues the World Bank Inspection Panel lags behind 
55 The Inspection Panel, above, n 51, at 16.
56 Bradlow, above n 36, at 484.
57 Ibid, at 486.
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some – though not all – of the other institutional mechanisms. On the issue 
of “lessons learnt”, Bradlow sees this as a particular failing as it means that 
the World Bank’s Executive Board and Management “are currently being 
deprived of … unique knowledge about the impact of their operations on 
affected communities and about the implementation of their operational 
policies and procedures.”58
Second, he notes a progression – what he refers to as “generations” of 
inspection procedures – within such institutions.59 What he means by this 
is relatively nuanced but essentially it is the narrative of how complaint 
and grievance mechanisms have evolved from the model established by the 
World Bank (“first generation”), to incorporating problem-solving within 
the compliance function (“second generation”), through to retaining these 
diverse functions but ensuring they are administered separately (“third 
generation”).60 This “generational” account would seem to be a reasonably 
accurate description of the development of such mechanisms, though it must 
also be recognised that there is also room for over-generalisation, especially 
outside the financial arena. For instance, a small (yet increasing) number of 
UN institutions61 which permit consideration of external complaints have not 
established bespoke mechanisms but have rather “opened-up” their internal 
procedures for external complaints.62 This may be far from ideal, though it 
does again indicate the inherent flexibility and broad span of approaches 
currently taken, as well as, perhaps, a disinclination to endorse complex 
institutional arrangements in all instances. 
C. The Kosovo Ombudsperson
One of the most notable examples of a recent complaints mechanism 
established through the framework of international law – though, in reality, 
it had more of the appearance of a domestic procedure, or at least a hybrid of 
the two – was the creation of the “Ombudsperson Institution” by the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Established 
in June 200063 by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
under authority given to him by the UN Security Council to administer the 
territory, the role of the ombudsperson was to:64
58 Ibid, at 462.
59 Ibid, at 484.
60 Cf Reif, above n 10, at 365: “all of the mechanisms are limited to an examination of the 
organization’s policies and procedures and do not have the freedom to look at other legal 
norms or fairness considerations”.
61 Such as the UN Development Programme, the UN Environment Programme and the World 
Food Programme.
62 R Lloyd, J Oatham and M Hammer 2007 Global Accountability Report (One World Trust, 
London, 2007) at 53. 
63 On the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo UNMIK/REG/2000/38 
(2000).
64 Ibid, at [1.1]. 
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… promote and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and legal entities and 
ensure that all persons in Kosovo are able to exercise effectively the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms safeguarded by international human rights standards, in particular 
the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Though established by the UN, the ombudsperson institution was, in 
fact, developed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) as part of the broader multi-agency approach to tackling the range of 
complex administrative, institutional, economic, security and political issues in 
Kosovo, subsequent to NATO’s intervention in 1999.65 The establishment of 
the ombudsperson was considered particularly necessary as the international 
community, in establishing UNMIK, had ranged beyond its normal functional 
capacities to undertake one of the most ambitious tasks in its history. Along 
with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET),66 the 
undertaking of “international territorial administration”67 in Kosovo raised 
a variety of institutional and practical questions, as well as generating more 
fundamental issues around the very “act” of international organisations 
administering a territory.68 In effect, the UN and its institutional partners were 
not just behaving as – but for a significant period of time were – the governing 
administration of Kosovo, together with all the incumbent rights and legitimate 
expectations of how such a government should operate. Thus, with the 
international actors performing this enlarged role of domestic administration, 
it is of little surprise that there was a concurrent demand for accountability 
mechanisms similar to those that exist in many national jurisdictions. 
Of course, such accountability is not a legal prerequisite, per se; nothing 
is formally required beyond the normative force of a UN Security Council 
resolution.69 However, it is unimaginable that UNMIK should not also seek 
domestic support, if not broader legitimacy, for its actions, particularly as such 
institutional control raises both political and jurisprudential issues about the 
very special relationship between the UN and those it is seeking to protect. As 
65 For a succinct history of the establishment of the Kosovo Ombudsperson, see C Waters 
“Human Rights in an International Protectorate: Kosovo’s Ombudsman” (2000) 4 The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook 141-152. More generally, on the role of ombudsmen as 
a feature of post-conflict peace-building, see Reif, above n 10, chapter 8.
66 UNTAET was in operation between 1999 and 2002. See also Reif, above n 10, at 285: 
“In the case of East Timor, UN transitional administration lasted less than three years and 
a UNTAET Ombudsperson operated for about one year before East Timor became an 
independent state – although it was a welcome development, there was not much time for the 
office to be formalized or developed”.
67 On this issue, see R Wilde Territorial Administration by International Organizations: How 
Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008).
68 As regards the very different issues which arose resolving post-conflict tension in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the role of the ombudsman therein, see A Wetzel “Post-Conflict 
National Human Rights Institutions: Emerging Models from Northern Ireland and Bosnia 
& Herzegovina” (2007) 13 Colum J Eur L 427.
69 In this case, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) 10 June 1999. 
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the Kosovo ombudsperson noted in Special Report No.1 (2001), “UNMIK 
acts as a surrogate state”.70 Of course, the creation of an accountability 
mechanism is not the only – or, by itself, the exclusive – means to generate 
such legitimacy; in particular, a traditional ombudsman is rarely considered 
an adequate replacement for – rather than a corollary and supplement to –the 
rule of law, as administered by the courts. Nevertheless, ensuring that the local 
population can ‘air’ their grievances has increasingly been accepted as having 
a significant role in the wider machinery of government. It is also important 
to note that the function of the Kosovo ombudsperson was never just limited 
to receiving – and investigating – complaints against the international 
administration of the territory, but was also “to provide oversight for local 
self-governing bodies, bodies which have grown in importance as UNMIK’s 
role has shrunk”.71
There was, however, a second – and arguably more substantive – factor 
which justified the creation of an ombudsman-like process within UNMIK. 
It was that in administering Kosovo during this period, the United Nations 
maintained the traditional view that international organisations and their staff 
possessed legal immunity from local jurisdiction. This clearly separated them 
from national governments, especially those in liberal democracies, which 
are subject to judicial review and/or oversight by municipal courts. As the 
ombudsperson again noted, quite pointedly in the same first special report:72
… no democratic state operating under the rule of law accords itself total immunity from 
any administrative, civil or criminal responsibility. Such blanket lack of accountability 
paves the way for the impunity of the state. … the actions and operations of [the executive 
and legislative] branches of government must be subject to the oversight of the judiciary, 
as the arbiter of legality in a democratic society. 
 The creation of the ombudsperson was, in part, to counter this lack of 
accountability; indeed, a total lack of accountability would undoubtedly be 
incompatible with recognised standards of human rights. Though the level of 
control and compulsion exerted by an ombudsman, in contrast to a judicial 
body, is ultimately based upon persuasiveness rather than legal authority, this 
is not necessarily an obstacle to effectiveness. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that in most national systems, the office of ombudsman co-exists alongside 
a fully functioning judicial structure. Whether an ombudsman is able to 
operate as completely and successfully without this supporting pillar of the 
rule of law is debatable.73
70 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No. 1: on the compatibility with recognised 
international standards of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and 
Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo (18 August 2000) and on the 
Implementation of the above Regulation (2001) at [23].
71 C Waters “Nationalising Kosovo’s Ombudsperson” (2007) 12 JC&SL 139.
72 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, above n 70, at [23]-[24].
73 P Diamandouros, European Ombudsman “The role of the Ombudsman in strengthening 
accountability and the rule of law” (Speech to the Constitution Unit, University College London, 
London, 29 November 2005).
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Nevertheless, and notwithstanding such reservations, the creation of 
the Kosovo ombudsperson remains an important innovation in this area 
of international law. Moreover, the role of the ombudsperson (to “ensure 
that all persons in Kosovo are able to exercise effectively … [their] human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”) would seem to be encouragingly broad. 
However, it should be noted that this generously-worded purpose is somewhat 
narrowed by a noticeably more specific jurisdictional remit. First, though 
the ombudsperson was to investigate complaints “concerning human rights 
violations and actions constituting an abuse of authority by the interim civil 
administration or any emerging central or local institution”, the ombudsperson 
was denied jurisdiction over complaints against the “international security 
presence”74 until such time as the commander of KFOR, the international 
security force, entered into an agreement with the ombudsperson. This, in 
fact, never occurred, thus placing one of the most significant areas of potential 
complaints outside the reach of the ombudsperson’s jurisdiction. However, 
while this prevented the ombudsperson from receiving complaints directly 
concerning the international security presence, that did not prevent the 
ombudsperson from imaginatively ensuring that more general issues which 
affected both the civil and military aspects of the international framework 
were effectively scrutinised. In his work on the possible establishment of 
ombudsmen in peace support operations, Zwanenburg notes that the Kosovo 
ombudsperson did not shy away from incorporating references to KFOR when 
required, thus suggesting that the office “indirectly exercises jurisdiction … 
in spite of the lack of a formal basis for jurisdiction”.75 This is perhaps too 
strong a conclusion, though it does highlight the inherent flexibility which 
is entrusted to an ombudsman, especially where the competence is of a 
sufficiently broad character. 
It is also worth noting, in this regard, that such flexibility was also used 
by the ombudsperson to “stretch” the applicable law to include consideration 
not just of human rights standards but also, arguably rather tentatively, basic 
tenets of international humanitarian law, where applicable.76 This again 
underlines the rather difficult task of accurately demarcating in practice the 
remit of an ombudsman, particularly when the original mandate would 
appear to conflict with what the ombudsman him-/herself considers to be 
fair and in accordance with general principles of good governance and the 
rule of law.
The second limitation on the jurisdiction of the ombudsperson was its 
focus on human rights violations; though commendable that the function 
of the ombudsperson was so intrinsically tied to the protection of recognised 
standards of human rights, there was some regret that there was not a more 
general role in the investigation of maladministration, as more generally 
74 On the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, above n 63, at [3.4].
75 Zwanenburg, above n 7, at 310.
76 Ibid, at 308-310.
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understood.77 Maladministration is a key focus of many domestic complaint 
and grievance-style mechanisms. In reality, this may not have been a particularly 
serious issue; as has been commented upon, “the Ombudsperson seems to 
interpret the term ‘abuse of authority’ broadly to include many elements of 
maladministration as defined by, for example, the European Ombudsman”.78 
Third, the ombudsperson was precluded from investigating disputes 
between the international administration and its staff. Fourth, as the 
political situation changed in Kosovo, and following the arguably premature 
“nationalization” of the ombudsperson in 2006,79 oversight of UNMIK became 
less transparent as accountability was transferred from the ombudsperson to a 
less independent Human Rights Advisory Panel.80
Thus, it is very clear that within the very fabric of the jurisdiction of 
the ombudsperson institution itself existed some very obvious limitations, 
reflecting significant political and institutional tensions concerning both its 
initial set-up and the extent of its mandate. And while it would be wrong to 
suggest that the work of the ombudsperson was thus hamstrung from the 
start, it is reasonably clear that while playing an important, if limited, role in 
the rebuilding and reconstruction of Kosovo, this was perhaps despite, rather 
than because of, the political will to support proactively its work. As Hoffman 
and Mégret cautiously observe:81
Despite … successes, this image of emerging accountability has been substantially 
blurred. The ombudsperson is essentially an OSCE institution, tolerated rather than 
supported by the UN. The UN’s cooperation and responsiveness record vis-à-vis the 
ombudsperson has been dismal. 
The same authors conclude that the principal lesson to be learnt from the 
Kosovan experience is that though “there seems to be nothing impossible 
in theory about having ombudspersons exercise vigorous scrutiny over the 
UN itself”, actual practice suggests all is dependent upon political support, 
especially where “institutional resistance remains high”.82
III. A UN Ombudsman?
Thus, when compared to the operation of ombudsmen at the national 
level, even the most advanced of complaint and grievance mechanisms at the 
international level, whilst innovative, are nevertheless structurally limited. 
However, achievements can be identified and their institutional designs can 
be viewed as realistic given the political context within which they were 
77 Waters, above n 65, 145.
78 Zwanenburg, above n 7, at 307.
79 See Waters, above n 71.
80 Ibid, at 144-145. See also B Knoll and R Uhl “Too Little, Too Late: The Human Rights 
Advisory Panel in Kosovo” (2007) 7 EHRLR 534.
81 F Hoffmann and F Mégret “Fostering Human Rights Accountability: An Ombudsman for 
the United Nations?” (2005) 11 Global Governance 43 at 56.
82 Ibid, at 57.
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established. The question becomes how much further can the non-judicial 
concept of complaint and redress mechanisms go at the international level? 
Already, the experience of the Kosovo ombudsman has led others to call 
for more ambitious complaint and grievance mechanisms either in discrete 
areas previously devoid of such procedures (such as the gradual emergence 
of accountability mechanisms in peacekeeping, “peace support” and 
humanitarian operations) or, more radically, for the UN as a whole. Certainly, 
some action, if of variable and limited nature, has already taken place, though 
undoubtedly such processes could be greatly strengthened in both instances.
As regards accountability innovations in discrete areas of UN activity, there 
have, for instance, been obvious developments in the use of accountability 
mechanisms during peacekeeping and peace support operations. After several 
high profile human rights and sexual abuse scandals, involving particularly 
peacekeepers in various zones of conflict in Africa, which highlighted to many 
for the first time83 that the UN – through its staff – was able to breach, rather 
than promote, human rights,84 the UN has been keen to be seen proactively 
dealing with the problem.85 
As the UN’s Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations noted 
in a letter printed in the British newspaper The Independent in 2007:86 
… we have established conduct and discipline teams and independent investigative 
offices in all of our largest peacekeeping operations and training on prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse is now mandatory for all of our peacekeeping personnel in the field. 
Missions have established networks of focal points to receive complaints of this nature 
and premises where prostitution is known or suspected to occur are placed off-limits 
to our personnel and patrolled. Other measures such as curfews, “non-fraternization” 
policies and “hotlines” for anonymous complaints are also in place in many missions. It 
may be impossible to completely ensure zero incidents, but we can and do mandate zero 
tolerance. 
This would appear to be an impressive response – at least from a particularly 
low base – and accountability forms just one part of a much more complex 
package of measures that the UN is increasingly attempting to put in place to 
try to ensure that not only are past wrongs not repeated but that institutional 
responses are in place if they do reoccur. 
However, there remains a residual concern amongst some that senior 
officials in the UN are unconvinced, despite the general acceptance of greater 
accountability to deal with such shocking acts, of the need for even greater 
83 Cf ibid at 44: “Already during the UN operation in the Republic of Congo (1960-1964), 
for example, concerns were raised about the possibility that troops operating under UN 
command had violated international humanitarian law”. 
84 See, for instance, F Mégret and F Hoffmann “The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some 
Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities” (2003) 25 
Hum Rts Q 314.
85 Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse, ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003).
86 J-M Guéhenno “USG Guéhenno responds on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN 
peacekeepers” The Independent (UK) 9 January 2007.
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and more radical institutional change. As has been argued, the UN adopts a 
“somewhat ambiguous attitude towards its own accountability”,87 traversing 
somewhere between accepting responsibility and seeking to ensure that others, 
such as the State providing the peacekeepers, take the lead in ensuring the 
necessary measures are adopted. Though such criticism perhaps underplays 
the extent to which the UN does accept responsibility both in law and in 
practice for actions that are attributable to it,88 it nevertheless highlights a 
perennial issue for those individuals who are seeking redress in being able 
to identify the relevant body responsible. Such a problem is, unsurprisingly, 
greatly exacerbated at the international level where delimitation of roles and 
responsibilities, particularly between the plenary jurisdiction of the State and 
the more limited role of international institutions, is usually less than clearly 
defined.
More radical still, there have also been suggestions that the UN would 
benefit from a wide-ranging ombudsman, with a significant overview of much 
of what the UN does. Of course, all organisations within the UN family do 
have accountability mechanisms to a certain extent already, ranging from 
offices of audit and internal oversight89 to work-place ombudsmen and, in a 
few cases, external complaint mechanisms. As noted above, the UN General 
Assembly itself established an office of ombudsman in 2002, though its 
function is limited to “address[ing] the employment-related problems of staff 
members”.90 
Nevertheless, for those who view accountability as a prerequisite of good 
governance and, in particular, a means to uphold key norms and values, 
especially the protection of human rights within international institutions, a 
more radical answer is required:91
… [I]f the UN wanted to send a strong signal to the world community that it was serious 
about accountability, the best solution would point in the direction of a new, sui generis 
organ along the lines of the EU ombudsperson. … Although legitimate concerns about 
costs are bound to arise, centralizing the tasks of the ombudsperson … would probably 
be a much more cost-effective measure than the multiplication of theatre- or agency-
specific mechanisms. 
87 Hoffmann and Mégret, above n 81, at 47.
88 P Sands and P Klein Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (5th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2001) at 520: “Breaches of international obligations by members of UN peacekeeping 
forces have been inevitably attributed to the organisation itself, rather than to the member 
states providing the contingent to which the peacekeepers concerned were attached.”
89 Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations GA 
Res 48/218 B, at 3, A/Res/48/218 B (1994): “The purpose of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services is to assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling his internal oversight responsibilities 
in respect of the resources and staff of the Organization through the exercise of the following 
functions: (i) Monitoring. … (ii) Internal audit. … (iii) Inspection and evaluation. … (iv) 
Investigation. … [and] (v) Implementation of recommendations and reporting procedures”.
90 Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Office of the Ombudsman – appointment and terms of reference of 
the Ombudsman at [1], ST/SGB/2002/12 (2002).
91 Hoffmann and Mégret, above n 81, at 60.
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How such an ombudsman office would in fact work would, of course, 
be subject to a plethora of practical and political objections. Key issues that 
would need to be resolved include the appointment and tenure of such an 
ombudsman, the extent of its jurisdiction,92 the scope of its investigatory 
powers, the range of ADR techniques at its disposal (ie whether it would be 
focused on compliance-review or also mediation), and the line of authority (ie 
to whom would an ombudsman report?). These are, of course, general matters 
relating to any ombudsman; but one can also think of some institutional-
specific difficulties, including – as merely examples of how difficult it will 
be to demarcate between the permissible and impermissible – how far would 
such an ombudsman be able to receive complaints about the work of the UN’s 
political organs including the Security Council, should the ombudsman be 
able to receive complaints if it also involves activities of States and how should 
the work of the ombudsman relate to the role of the International Court 
of Justice as the principal judicial body within the UN system? Moreover, 
who would be entitled to make a complaint and how would the UN ensure 
that those who depend upon the UN the most – those most marginalised in 
the global South – benefit from simply another administrative innovation 
far removed from their daily existence? These are all difficult issues, and 
while similar matters have been raised at the national level and not proved 
insurmountable to resolve, the scale of the project at the international level is 
recognised to be of a significantly different magnitude. 
Notwithstanding the myriad of practical and political hurdles which 
would bedevil such a project, the existence of greater accountability 
mechanisms would arguably not only serve to enhance the reputation 
of individual UN operations, but would also improve the legitimacy of 
the organisation of the UN as a whole. However, what becomes quickly 
apparent is that just as States fervently protect their own national interests 
wherever they are perceived to be at risk, international institutions are 
equally defensive of their own rights and responsibilities. In this regard, the 
“opening up” of institutions through complaint and grievance mechanisms 
is often viewed with a certain level of suspicion and mistrust as to how 
far the process will undermine how such organisations have traditionally 
functioned. What is often missing in such deliberations, however, is the 
realisation that such accountability mechanisms are now viewed as integral 
to the implementation of good governance, which itself is increasingly 
essential to ensuring international organisations possess both political 
credibility and, more fundamentally, normative legitimacy. 
92 This includes the very contentious issue of how far the mandate ratione materiae of such an 
ombudsman should range beyond procedural issues to incorporate matters of substance and 
policy. For instance, should a UN ombudsman be able to receive complaints about the lack 
of sanitation in a UN-run refugee camp from its inhabitants? (Thanks to a member of the 
audience at Brunel Law School, United Kingdom, who raised this issue during a presentation 
of this article for this example.)
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IV. Complaint Mechanisms: Increasing Synergies, Avoiding 
Unfair Comparisons
One of the central rationales of this article has been that a well-functioning 
complaint and grievance mechanism (including the office of the ombudsman) 
can go a long way towards promoting and achieving accountability within 
a governance structure and defending the rule of law, whether that be at 
the national, regional or global level. There is inevitably some debate as to 
whether such processes can only ever truly work where there is a sufficient 
link between the institution and the complainant, most clearly shown in the 
connexion between national and local administrations and the demos they 
serve.93 But it has been argued in this article that such mechanisms are also 
useful at the international level to ensure improved operational performance 
and accountability to stakeholders. 
This may, on first glance, suggest a relatively restrictive understanding 
of the place of such mechanisms within international institutions, which 
focuses upon their utility in increasing the overall effectiveness of such 
organisations rather than recognising the broader constitutional significance 
of complaint and grievance mechanisms.94 However, as has been highlighted 
above, the establishment of innovative accountability mechanisms also 
plays a significant role in ensuring the development of increased standards 
of good governance and legitimacy within international institutions. There 
can be little denying how important the existence of transparent, accessible 
and administratively-workable accountability mechanisms has become, both 
within those international organisations that have adopted such procedures 
and, more generally, within the broader dialogue on the future direction of 
international institutional governance. 
Moreover, it is not just the existence of complaint and grievance 
mechanisms per se that is important – though undoubtedly they are both 
novel and innovative in their own right – it is the role of such mechanisms 
in allowing private individuals and local communities to complain, to a 
greater or lesser extent, about the policies and procedures of hitherto 
hermetically-sealed international institutions that truly underlines their 
93 This is not to suggest that there are not increased links between private individuals and 
international organisations, but rather that the connexion between them is usually more 
distant than the connexion between the individual and the administrative apparatus of his/
her State. This is, of course, not as true as once it were; as the work of the European Union, 
United Nations and the World Bank – to a greater or lesser extent – shows, international 
organisations are now affecting the lives and behaviours of individuals much more directly, 
and with less direct State involvement (see also Bodansky, above n 11).
94 For an alternative understanding on the role and status of complaint and grievance 
mechanisms at the international level, see the “concentric circles” approach of Reif, above n 
10, at 364-365: the “inner circle of activity” of the workplace ombudsman, the middle circle 
“representing an organization’s attempts to improve the relationship among member states” 
(Reif notes that this “has not been the site of the development of the ombudsman”, but see the 
Warwick Commission, above n 8) and the outer circle “provid[ing] an external accountability 
mechanism for non-state actors affected by its activities”.
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overall importance. As well as reflecting what Zwanenburg previously 
referred to as “a corollary of the demand for accountability of international 
organizations, and in particular accountability towards individuals”,95 the 
“opening up” of such mechanisms to individuals and local communities is, 
equally, a substantive contribution to the engagement of the individual as a 
participant in international law.96 
Thus, it must be recognised that the role of individuals in these processes 
is far from being purely instrumental – the individual qua catalyst for 
complaint handling and institutional review – what is actually happening 
is that individuals are, in fact, seeking to enforce their interests. These 
interests may not necessarily always be legal rights or entitlements in the 
traditional sense of the term, though, as with the Kosovo Ombudsman, if the 
complaints are human-rights based, this does suggest a potential amalgam 
of private complaint and legal right. Thus, such mechanisms permit, if not 
also directly encourage, individuals to assert that which they were unable to 
protect previously at the international level, and in an increasingly expansive 
number of international organisations. In short, not only is this an important 
– if still putative – constitutional sea-change in the status of the individual 
in international law, but it also heralds an emerging expectation in how 
international organisations should operate and treat non-State interests. This 
may, of course, be overstating the actuality of the current situation and how, 
in particular, such mechanisms operate in practice, but one cannot deny a 
fundamental shift has now taken place.
Moreover, as noted above, there is a strong argument that much of 
what has happened at the global level is reflective of changing patterns in 
institutional behaviour, which were first introduced at the national and 
regional level. To this extent, it is unsurprising that many of the same 
issues arise concerning how such mechanisms should (and do) operate 
and the continuing obstacles they face. This linkage between the global 
and national is not all one-way either. There is also evidence that the 
international community is aware of the positive benefits that can be gained 
through the development of these and other methods of ADR. So, for 
instance, in recent years, many international organisations have promoted 
the work of such mechanisms at the national level in contributing towards 
the implementation of standards of good governance and human rights, 
often as part of a wider development agenda.97 
95 Zwanenburg, above n 7 (emphasis added).
96 Moreover, without seeking to question the validity of Franck’s general work on the legitimacy 
of international law, in which he propounds four “indicators”: determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence and adherence (Franck, above n 1, at 30-46), it might be tentatively 
suggested that consideration also be given to a fifth, participation – both at the stage of 
formation of the rule/policy and, in this context, at the stage of post hoc accountability. 
97 See, for instance, Reif, above n 10, at 70: “In proposing ideas for strengthening good 
governance, the [United Nations Development Programme] has suggested the establishment 
of ombudsman and human rights oversight bodies”.
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However, any attempt to make direct comparisons between the techniques 
adopted at the global and national levels has to be approached cautiously, 
especially given the very different approaches to, and attributes of, governance 
that exist.98 To that extent, it would be a mistake to argue for a “one model 
fits all” approach to the utility of the ombudsman and other complaint and 
grievance mechanisms. Thus, a preliminary conclusion must inevitably 
be that automatic replication of such mechanisms should be avoided, and 
concurrently that any such proposal must therefore always take into account 
the particular institutional and political framework in which it is to operate. 
This is not to say that there are not certain fundamental features which all 
such mechanisms should demonstrate, but rather that they should be applied 
flexibly and with due care for the overarching governance structure already in 
place. Moreover, it should also not be ignored that though such mechanisms 
are rarely considered a form of “dispute settlement” in the formal sense of the 
term – “dispute avoidance” often being considered a better description – they 
share very similar goals. Though complaint and grievance mechanisms do not 
have the inherent characteristics of either judicial proceedings or arbitration, 
at a generic level, the purpose of each in seeking to resolve differences, to 
ensure accountability and perhaps to provide redress are ultimately not very 
far apart.99 Thus, complaint and grievance mechanisms should be viewed not 
only as innovative in the way international organisations operate internally but 
also as an alternative means of raising external issues of accountability within 
them. Of course, complaint and grievance mechanisms are not an institutional 
panacea for the perceived failings of international dispute settlement, and the 
truth is that such mechanisms should at best be considered supplementary 
procedures, and only then within certain institutional settings. 
Nevertheless, what might originally appear to be the weaknesses in 
such complaint and grievance mechanisms – their limited jurisdiction, 
their lack of binding authority, their dependence on political goodwill for 
subsequent implementation – are also potential strengths. It is relatively 
clear that many of the international organisations which have incorporated a 
complaint and grievance mechanism within their governance model would 
be wholly unwilling to establish more intrusive procedures – with greater 
legal enforcement powers – over the same subject-matter. This is not a viable 
political alternative: it is simply unrealistic to expect the World Bank, for 
instance, to permit independent judicial supervision of its operating policies 
98 This also raises a more wide-ranging question of methodology and approach. As this was 
the first time both of us had written with someone from each other’s respective disciplines, 
discerning the “public” in (domestic) administrative law and international law – and how this 
“public” is both congruent and divergent from each other – has highlighted broader issues 
deserving further exploration.
99 On a related point, see Merrills, above n 4, at 315-316: “the role of law and the role of 
adjudication are two issues, not one … While it is difficult to imagine adjudication without 
law, law without adjudication is actually the normal situation in international affairs … [A]
lthough international disputes are generally resolved without adjudication, law will frequently 
play a significant part in defining the points in issue”.
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and procedures, rather than the present practice of accountability via the in-
house Inspection Panel. Such “softer” forms of dispute resolution, which are 
able to respond more flexibly to the competing demands of an international 
governance system so very obviously predicated on national and institutional 
interests, reflect more accurately the political contours of the current 
international system.100 
In any event, it is not at all clear that “harder” procedures would be any 
more effective in incorporating the ideals of legitimacy and governance 
within international institutions. In this area of international law and policy, 
the maxim “the perfect is the enemy of the good” seems particularly apt; 
in fact, it is not at all clear that other – binding – processes could achieve 
as much as complaint and grievance mechanisms have the potential to do. 
The goal of international institutions must now be to refine and build upon 
the mechanisms that already exist to ensure that such “good” is realised still 
further.
100 Moreover, as is clear from this article, it is not yet the situation that all international 
organisations are either prepared to adopt even “soft” accountability mechanisms or that 
they are firmly – and permanently – embedded within the institutional “consciousness”. See 
Shihata, above n 33, at 264: “Once accountability to the affected public is postulated as 
an efficient complementary element in the overall accountability system of an international 
organization, it is difficult to see why such an element should be restricted to … multilateral 
development institutions. Obviously, this would not be the case if the function were to 
contradict or dilute existing systems of governance and accountability in the organization 
involved or otherwise hinder its efficient operation” (emphasis added). 
